Facturación comercial y flujos financieros ilícitos: un enfoque desde la teoría de juegos

Abstract

His essay analyzes the practice of trade mis-invoicing, understood as a deliberate strategy through which economic agents manipulate the declared values in international trade operations in order to evade taxes, shift capital, or exploit regulatory loopholes. Using game theory as an analytical framework, the paper models the behavior of agents who weigh the benefits of fraud against the risk of detection and applicable sanctions. Four types of mis-invoicing (A–D) are examined, along with scenarios of repeated interaction, collusion between counterparties, and abusive transfer pricing. The paper discusses available empirical evidence and methodological tools such as the Partner Country Method (PCM) and the Price Filter Method (PFM), which help adjust risk perception and support policy recommendations. Among the main findings, it is shown that commercial fraud is not a random phenomenon but a strategic decision influenced by the institutional environment, and that calibrated random audits, reputational incentives, and inter-institutional cooperation can shift compliance equilibria. Moreover, the study highlights that trade mis-invoicing (TM) should be understood beyond statistical estimations, as a rational behavior that requires comprehensive regulatory interventions.